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Abstract 
This research note develops a model of the institutional features 
of the international coffee agreement and analyzes the allocation of 
export quotas under the terms of the agreement in 1982. It suggests 
that the agreement can be viewed as a weighted majority voting game. 
It employs the assumption of rationality to predict how allocations 
should be made given the rules of the agreement and tests the model by 
determining whether the allocations which passed (failed) fell within 
(outside) of the solution of the game. 
A Note on the Operations of the International Coffee Agreement* 
Robert H. Bates and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien 
In this research note, we analyze the allocation of quotas to 
export coffee in 1982 under the terms of the international coffee 
agreement. 
Next to oil, coffee is the most valuable commodity traded in world 
markets; it. is produced in the developing world and consumed within the 
developed nations. Moreover, the international coffee agreement 
stands as the major successful international commodity agreement. A 
study of the way in which entitlements to export are allocated under 
the terms of the agreement therefore offers insights into significant 
features of the international political economy. 
The analysis is also important for analytic reasons. In recent 
years, scholars of international relations have exported the rational 
choice perspective from the field of strategic studies and applied it 
in other domains. In particular, important attempts have been made to 
apply rational choice analysis to the analysis of international 
agreements and the behavior of international organizations.I Our 
research note seeks to advance this trend. It does so by modeling an 
international political institution -- the international coffee 
agreement; and, assuming rational behavior, by analyzing the way in 
which that institution affects the international allocation of economic 
resources -- in this instance, export entitlements. 
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Background 
The international coffee agreement was ratified in 1962. Its 
membership includes the major consuming nations of Europe and North 
America, who account for 95 percent of annual consumption. Among 
producing nations, its membership includes every major exporter; only a 
handful of countries, each producing less than 100,000 bags per annum, 
remain outside the agreement. 
The agreement represents an attempt by producing and consuming 
nations to stabilize the price of coffee. The primary mechanism for 
price stabilization is the restriction of supplies to a level 
sufficient to maintain coffee prices within an agreed upon range (at 
the present time (1984) $1.20 to $1.40 a pound). The restrictions take 
the form of the imposition of quotas. To support the agreed upon price 
level, each producer agrees not to ship more than its assigned quota. 
Adherence to the quota is enforced through a system of stamps and 
certificates; the customs authorities of importing nations remit copies 
from each shipment to the headquarters of the organization which in the 
case of an overshipment can then call for a reduction of a country's 
quota. Producers which have fulfilled their quota can make further 
sales on the non-quota market; however, prices on that market currently 
average less than one-half of these on the quota market.2 
Frosts, insurrections and other "acts of God " have from time to 
time forced prices above the defense range, thereby leading to the 
suspension of quantity restrictions. The most recent suspension of the 
terms of the agreement occurred following the Brazilian frost of 1975. 
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Expanded production by other countries subsequently forced prices back 
down into the defense range, triggering a return to export 
restrictions. The question then arose: how was the burden of the 
restrictions to be allocated among producer nations? This note 
analyzes the apportioning of that burden in terms of the setting of 
quota restrictions upon exporters. It does so by analyzing the fate of 
two proposals for quota allocations which were advanced after the 
reimposition of export restrictions: one which was proposed in June 
1982 and which failed to secure adoption by the member states and 
another which was proposed in September 1982 and which was ratified. 
The Institution 
Formally, decisions having to do with the allocation of the quota 
are taken by vote. Consumer nations receive 1000 votes; so too do 
producer nations; and a two-thirds majority of each "house " is required 
to establish a binding allocation. Each nation receives a "base " vote 
plus additional votes based upon its past performance as a shipper or 
importer of coffee. While not all decisions in fact come to a vote, 
interviews with officers of the organization and delegates to its 
meetings suggest that anticipation of whether or not a measure would 
pass were it to be called to a vote helps to define whether it is a 
viable, as opposed to "defeatable, " proposal. The threat to use the 
rules to vote down proposals plays a significant role in negotiations. 
While the rules of the organization state that production quotas 
must be agreed to by a two-thirds majority of the votes of both the 
consumers and producer members, interviews reveal that while producer 
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and consumer nations in fact do negotiate the overall price and 
quantity levels, the consumer nations refuse to get involved in the 
process of subdividing the overall quota into national quotas. When 
queried, American delegates noted that such involvement would cost a 
consumer nation more than it would gain; almost all of the producers 
are "our friends, " they indicated, and rewarding one with an increased 
national quota would only antagonize all the others whose quotas were 
diminished as a result. 
The rules of the organization allocate indicative quotas -- i.e. 
claims as to what a nation's quota might justifiably be. When 
calculating the quota entitlement of members upon the re-imposition of 
the agreement, the rules (specifically, Article 3 0) were written to 
allow producing nations to base their claims for a quota on their 
average exports for the period 1968/69 to 1971/72 or for the period 
1976/77 to 1979/80. Interviews made clear the reasons for this 
provision: In 1975, Brazil had been hit by a major frost; Columbia had 
expanded exports to take advantage of Brazil's misfortune; and to 
secure the adherence of the two "giants, " each had to be allowed to 
pick that basis for its quota which was most favorable. 
The rules also allocate votes. The votes are allocated on a 
weighted basis. Under Article 13 of the agreement at the time of the 
quota proposals of June and September 1982 -- the quotas which we wish 
to analyze -- votes were apportioned on the basis of the average volume 
of exports to importing members over the previous four years [i.e. 
1976/77 to 1979/80] .3 
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These rules define an institution amenable to analysis by rational 
choice theory. They define a weighted majority voting game. A variety 
of approaches are available for predicting allocations within the 
context of an institution possessing such a structure but most are 
extremely difficult to apply to "real world cases, " e.g. where the 
number of actors is large. There is one solution concept for which an 
algorithm exists which makes such applications possible: the Shapley 
value. In exploring the applicability of rational choice analysis to 
the analysis of international political institutions, we employ the 
Shapley value. 
The Shapley value can be thought of as a measure of the power of 
players to influence outcomes, given the rules of an institution. In 
an institution which allows weighted votes, the Shapley value can be 
thought of as a measure of the ability of a player to use its share of 
votes to turn coalitions into electoral majorities. Its measure is the 
proportion of all possible coalitions which a player can convert into 
winning (i.e. majority) coalitions. The ability of the player to be 
pivotal in that sense defines the player's power. The Shapley value 
therefore defines as well the share of the payoffs which each player 
can expect to get, given its ability to exploit its strategic 
opportunities to make (or to refuse to make) coalitions into winning 
coalities. It therefore suggests as well the allocational outcome of 
the game, in terms of the payoffs which should be expected to go to 
each player. While we agree with many of the criticisms offered the 
Shapley value, we have calculated the Owen approximation of it and 
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sought to determine whether it allows us to account for the allocation 
of the coffee quota in 1982.4 
The Analysis 
where 
Our discussion implies the following model of the institution: 
(1) wi f(pli) 
g(wi) 
h(Si,P2i) 
By Article 13. 
(2) Si 
(3) q • i 
By assumption of rational behavior. 
By Article 30 and prediction. 
W· 1 
Si 
qli
q2i
P!i 
Pii 
P2i 
The proportion of votes held by producer i. 
The Shapley value of producer i. 
The quota assigned to producer i, under the June 1982 
proposal. 
The quota assigned to producer i, under the September 
1982 proposal. 
Country i's average export share to importing members 
of the !CO, 1976/77 to 1979/80. 
Country i's average export share to importing members 
of the !CO, 1968/69 to 1971/72. 
The maximum of either country i's average export share 
to importing members of the !CO for periods 1968/69 to 
1971/72 (pii) or for the period 1976/77 to 1979/80 
(pli). 
The three equations represent a model of the way in which the 
institution and its rules determine the allocation of the quota. The 
most direct test of this model of the operations of the coffee 
agreement is offered by coefficients in equation 3, which, along with 
the other equations, can be estimated through two-stage least squares 
using the constant term, Pl and P2 as instrumental variables. 
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If rational behavior determines the impact of the rules of the 
international coffee agreement upon allocations, then we can make two 
predictions. We would not expect the coefficient of the Shapley value 
to be significant in the case of the quota that failed (q1); we would 
expect it to be significant in the case of the quota that passed (q2).
Given that the institution defines a weighted majority voting game, in 
other words, we would expect that a quota allocation which "passed" 
would have to conform to the (Shapley) solution of the game. As can be 
seen in the following results, our expectations are fulfilled: 
ql 
q2 
o.1354 + o.9410pz 
( 1.0986) ( 13. 7 564) 
-o .2219 + o. 8281p2 
(-1.8765) (12.2902) 
+ 0.0322S 
(0.4246) 
+ 0.2175S 
(2.9156) 
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics with seventeen degrees of 
freedom. 
An additional result is of interest: we find that the Shapley 
value explains the allocation of the quota better than the measure of 
raw votes, or, in particular, the proportion of votes. The Shapley 
value bears the following relationship to the proportion of votes: 
s 0.8227w + 
( 26 .6 932) 
0.0156w2 
(8.7515) 
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In this instance, there are eighteen degrees of freedom. We have 
constrained the intercept to be zero because it makes little sense for 
a country possessing no votes to be able to convert coalitions into 
majority winners which might otherwise remain voting minorities. The 
sign and significance of the second coefficient suggests, as one would 
expect, that big powers are disproportionately advantaged by their 
ability to "pivot" -- that is, to convert coalitions into majorities. 
But what is most interesting is what happens when this approximation to 
the Shapley value is substituted into the equation "predicting " q2' 
i.e. the successful quota. 
q2 0.0388 
(0.2019) 
R2 = 0.9981 
+ 0.093 4w 
(1.4702) 
+ 0.0086w2
(2.2815) 
+ o.8o5opz 
(14.7572) 
Here there are sixteen degrees of freedom. The coefficient of w2 still 
remains significant. This result suggests it is not just votes which 
determine quotas; rather, it is also the strategic advantages confined 
by requirement that votes be majorities -- advantages which accrue 
disproportionately to the bigger powers (such as Brazil) and give them 
larger quotas than one would expect, given the distribution of votes.5 
Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, it is interesting to summarize the economic 
impact of the political rules defined by the international coffee 
agreement by calculating on the basis of the values of the parameters 
estimated above the economic value of an additional vote. Assuming 
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that coffee sells at $1.40 a pound; that a bag contains 132 lbs.; and 
that the world's exportable production is constrained to 58 million 
bags, then, according to the above equation, for a very small producer 
(say Kenya with 23 votes), an additional vote would be worth about 
$168.5 million per annum. For a "large " producer (say Brazil with 190 
votes), an additional vote would be worth $566.1 million per annum. 
Given the third world's need for foreign exchange, the magnitude of 
these values suggest the economic significance of the political 
features of the coffee agreement. 
* 
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4. 
there is a one-year lag in revising the votes. Although this 
might not be realistic, because of the stability of market shares 
in the short run, this regression result should still apply even 
if we assume no lag in the allocation of votes. 
A useful introduction to the Shapley value, its problems and other 
solution concepts is contained in William H. Riker and Peter C. 
Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973) . For the approximation to the 
Shapley value employed in this paper, see Guillermo Owen, Game 
Theory (New York: Academic Press, 1982) .  For our problem, the 
Shapley value for i-th player is defined as: 
s. 
l. I i£T 
(t-1) ! (N-t) ! 
N! 
where the summation is taken over all winning coalitions (i.e. a 
collection of members for which the summation of votes exceeds 
two-thirds of the total votes) T such that T-{i} is not winning, t 
is then the number of elements in T, and N is the number of 
players. A major problem with the Shapley value is that in 
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calculating it all coalitions are treated as equally likely. 
Under many circumstances, this is likely to be untrue. 
5. We can also estimate the system by GLS, which yields the following 
results: 
(1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
(4) 
w 
s 
= 0. 3783 + 0.9242p�
(2. 3 540) (44. 1826 
= 0. 8399w + 0. 0146w2 
(29. 8017) (9. 0766) 
ql = 0. 1889 + l. 0234py
(1.6557) (18. 1544 
q2 -0. 1986 + o. 8732pz 
(1. 6913) (15. 0502) 
- 0. 06108 
(0.9837) 
+ 0. 16658 
(2. 6081) 
Using two-stage least square estimation, the first equation is 
w = 0. 3783 + 0. 9242p1 , the same as obtained by GLS. 
(2. 3 540) (44. 1826) 
The two methods yield almost the same estimation and maintain the 
same qualitative results. In general, when error terms across 
equations are correlated, GLS will be biased. But for small 
sample cases, there are some situations in which GLS will dominate 
two stage least squares. See Robert S. Mariano, "Analytical Small-
Sample Distribution Theory in Econometrics: The Simultaneous-
Equations Case, " International Economic Review 23 (October 1982): 
503-33. We therefore provide both estimates for comparison. 
